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A poem telling the story of a man shooting a moose
is a narrative poem.
If the poem goes on for a long time and the moose
turns out to be his daughter who got screwed
by the lecherous, jealous gods and the man
then founds a city, it is an epic.
Many say the Age of the Epic is behind us,
the rain falls upon the moose corpse
and the murderous, capricious gods seem done with us,
killed or wandered oV, and, unattended,
unhouselled, we charge through the bracken
with only the burning hoof print of human love
upon us.
—Dean Young, “The Decoration Committee,” lines 1–131
What does it mean to begin with and from the claim that “the end of meta-
physics is at hand”? Undoubtedly, multiple things, but I want to focus on issues
involving the phrase “at hand” and the nature of the “claim,” leaving aside the
meaning of this “end” and “metaphysics.” First, ours is a century full of claims
concerning the end of metaphysics. In that sense, the claim is “at hand” in
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being readily available. From Carnap to Rorty, Horkheimer to Habermas, from
Heidegger to Derrida, traditions have gathered around the claim that meta-
physics has come to its end. The form of this availability bears notice, however.
As a claim, it is an assertion: “metaphysics is at its end.” And in its wake, one
expects arguments, arguments which support the assertion and ask that we 
support it as well.
The “end of metaphysics” is something more than an assertion, however.
Ours is a time when philosophers of diverse sensibilities cry out that meta-
physics is at its end. In the tradition of Carnap and Rorty, metaphysics has
drawn to an end given the triumph of naturalism, even if that triumph can only
claim a pragmatic (which is not to say pyrrhic) victory. Among the critical the-
orists, metaphysics, as a grounding discourse, has been superseded by a critical
theory whose reconstructive engine is fueled by the social sciences. And begin-
ning with Heidegger, the end of metaphysics names a kind of exhaustion, as 
if the path of inquiry opened by the question “what is the nature of X” had
reached a limit, one that metaphysics undoubtedly engages but cannot render
transparent. Quite a range. It seems, therefore, that the end of metaphysics 
is both a social phenomenon and an assertion. Perhaps we should approach 
the former from the etymological roots of “claim,” i.e., clamare, “to cry out,” for
many do cry out that metaphysics has come to an end. And yet, this is far 
from a univocal choir. The voices crying out are diverse to the point of incom-
patibility. We might do better, then, to pursue the matter through another 
descendent of clamare, i.e., “clamor,” for beginning with the claim “the end of
metaphysics is at hand” throws us into an uproar.
Another orienting thought. In the Lowell lectures of 1906, William James
writes of the pragmatist theory of truth: “I fully expect to see the pragmatist
view of truth run through the classic stages of a theory’s career. First, you know,
a new theory is attacked as absurd; then it is admitted to be true, but obvious
and insigni cant;  nally it is seen to be so important that its adversaries claim
that they themselves discovered it.”2 Concerning claims pertaining to the end
of metaphysics, I believe we are arriving at the end of stage two. Many, like
Rorty, consider the claim banal.3 We all know, he claims, that the heyday of
metaphysics is over, so let us get on with something more interesting, if not
more useful. But I want to pause in this banality, and note it, suggesting that
for some “the end of metaphysics is at hand” is like a light switch, a matter of
course; one  icks it on in order to get on with some other task.
For a third thought, let us return to the idea of a “claim.” Many, I claimed,
assert that metaphysics has come to its end. If we begin with and from the
claim that “the end of metaphysics is at hand,” we do so within the  gure of
thought that Heidegger terms an “assertion,” an Aussatz. This is signi cant, for
on Heidegger’s reading, the assertion prevents philosophy from recognizing the
end of metaphysics. Why? The assertion, schematized as “X is y ,” is not only
182 JOHN LYSAKER
“not the primary locus (Ort ) of truth,” something Heidegger notes in Sein und
Zeit, § 44, but is bound to Insistenz, to the errancy that Heidegger regards as a
“dogged sticking to what exists, to what is oVered by beings as if they were
open in and of themselves.”4 More speci cally, the assertion (or the proposi-
tion), in ascribing a predicate to a being, regards the being of this X in terms
of what is present in the form of essential traits, or speaking retroactively, as
empirical sciences do, in terms of those traits that can be said to endure through
a series of transformations. In so comporting ourselves towards X, we forget,
however, to interrogate the event of X’s and our presencing, and thus overlook
the Ort, the locus of disclosure. Now such forgetfulness de nes for Heidegger
the history of metaphysics as a kind of nihilism, for it thinks Sein only in terms
of das Seiende, as we do when asserting things, when predicating y of X. If we
ask then “what does it mean to begin with and from the claim that the end of
metaphysics is at hand,” we might conclude that this beginning already falls
back into metaphysics. Or, more humbly, we could “suggest” that to begin with
such a claim is to have only just begun, that is, we could “claim” that such a
claim opens the question of the end of metaphysics rather than answers it. In
this regard, the regard of the claim, the end of metaphysics would be at hand
only in a deferred sense, as something yet to be fathomed.
I want to draw one more preliminary thought from the notion of the claim,
if only to quiet the clamor of the day, scratch the banality of what is at hand
until it fades into strangeness, and heed Heidegger’s worries concerning the lim-
its of propositional thinking. Bracket, if you will, our tendencies to associate
claims with assertions, and consider a lead from Webster’s second edition. There
we are told that a claim is a “demand for something rightfully or allegedly
due.” With this de nition in mind, we might regard a philosophical claim as
an apologia on behalf of some matter to be thought, as a demand that some Sache
be recognized. If so, beginning with and from the claim that the end of meta-
physics is at hand could initiate a practice of bearing witness to a matter that
demands recognition. Having begun so, we could then declare, or rather cry
out, that the “end of metaphysics is at hand,” emphasizing that we are working
amidst an event “still on its way,” to recall Nietzsche’s announcement of the
death of god. And thus we might leave this exhortation with an admission: as
is evident from the clamor it has provoked, the end of metaphysics, as an event,
has laid claim to our age, and if we make claims on its behalf, we do so with
an awareness that we may need help from quarters not governed by assertions.
I. Heidegger’s Ear
He made a line on the blackboard,
one bold stroke from right to left
diagonally downward and stood back
to ask, looking at no one
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in particular, “What have I done?”
From the back of the room Freddie
shouted, “You’ve broken a piece
of chalk.” M. Degas did not smile.
“What have I done?” he repeated.
—Philip Levine, “M. Degas Teaches Art & Science At Durfee Intermediate
School Detroit, 1942,” lines 1–95
In 1946, amidst the nihilism that he found characteristic of metaphysics, a
nihilism that he aligned with the spread of modern technology as a mode of
disclosure grounded in forgetfulness, Heidegger asked “Wozu Dichter [What are
poets for?]” and proceeded to explore the work of Rilke. A few years earlier,
in 1942, he had invoked Hölderlin against the onslaught of America, whose
entry into World War II he described as “the ultimate act of American ahis-
toricality and self-devastation” (GA 53: 68; DI, 54–5). And still earlier, in 1934,
when the engines of death had begun to solidify their hold on the future of the
European Jewry, Heidegger had also turned to Hölderlin for direction, claim-
ing that the “poet is the grounder of being,” adding that the poetic is “the fun-
damental happening [Grundgeschehen] of the historical dasein of human beings”
(GA 39: 33, 36). But “direction” skews the matter, for when Heidegger turned
to Hölderlin in 1934, it was not for adornment or the lyric presentation of an
encrypted philosophical project. In fact, he warned against such approaches,
writing that: “The danger exists, that we [will] set the poetic work within con-
cepts, that we only [will] comb a poem for the philosophical opinions and
tenets of the poet, that we [will] piece together Hölderlin’s philosophical sys-
tem and explain the poetry from such an account” (GA 39: 5).6 In fact, not only
was Hölderlin not supposed to oVer us a philosophy in waiting, but he was to
be the source of the measure for this epoch: “We do not want to measure
Hölderlin according to our time, but the opposite: we want to bring ourselves
and those to come under the measure of the poet” (GA 39: 4). Not direction
then, but a measure, a Maß; this is what the poets oVer Heidegger; this is what
they are for at the end of metaphysics. But in what sense and for whom? What
is the nature of this poetic Maß? How does such a thing come to pass, even
work? What kind of measuring is under discussion here? And why is it poetic?
Why are poets the grounders of being? Finally, who shall be its standard bear-
ers, and what future shall receive the Heimat, the “homeland,” it demarcates?
In other words, whom are these poets, or this poet, for?7
Where should we begin? Perhaps with Heidegger’s ear. How does Martin
Heidegger read? In what way are his stirrup, anvil, and hammer aligned such
that textual vibrations strike him quite diVerently than they do the ears of other
readers? As many know, Heidegger refuses to employ traditional poetic theory.
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In fact, Heidegger eschews poetics altogether, preferring to allow the poems he
reads to determine for themselves the being of poetry. Why? Because tradi-
tional interpretation begins with an assumed understanding of the being of the
poem. For example, psychoanalytic readings assume that the production of
poetic discourse proceeds by way of unconscious forces saturated with subjec-
tive history. Likewise, Marxists employ a rhetoric of infrastructure and super-
structure in accounting for the passage of social forces into poetry. Heidegger,
on the other hand, wishes to allow the language of the poem to articulate its
own being, and thus his interpretations refuse to assume a poetics, hoping to
dissolve into the poems they would read. But how?
In answering this question, one must take note of the various studies which
have appeared over the last  fteen years or so, notably Gerald Bruns’ Heidegger’s
Estrangements and Véronique Fóti’s Heidegger and the Poets. Also, one should note
that in 1989, an entire issue of Research in Phenomenology was devoted to
Heidegger’s work on Hölderlin. And yet, among these studies, few have inter-
rogated Heidegger’s reading qua reading, and none with systematic intent.8
Indulge me, then, as I sketch such an account, engaging the distinction that
anchors Heidegger’s 1954 reading of Trakl, the distinction between Erörterung,
“exposition,” and Erläuterung, “clari cation.”9 Regarding the Erörterung, the
“exposition,” Heidegger informs us that, at least in its preliminary stages, it
seeks to “locate” or “point out” (weisen) as well as “heed” (beachten) the Ort, the
“site” of something. Heidegger calls the Ort the:
Spitze des Speers. In ihr läuft alles zusammen. Der Ort versammelt zu sich
ins Höchste und Äußerste . . . [adding that] der Ort, das Versammelnde, holt
zu sich ein, verwahrt das Eingeholte, aber nicht wie eine abschließende
Kapsel, sondern so, daß er das Versammelte durchscheint und durchleuchtet
und dadurch erst in sein Wesen entläßt. (UzS, 37; OWL, 159–60)
[tip of the spear. In it, everything runs together. The Ort gathers to itself from
what is loftiest and most extreme . . . [adding that] the Ort, the gathering, col-
lects and preserves what has been gathered, although not as an encapsula-
ting shell, but by shining through and illuminating that which has been
gathered, thus releasing it, for the  rst time, to its Wesen.]
According to the passage, the Ort is a gathering force. Beginning from ex-
tremes, an Ort collects something within its reach and releases it to its Wesen.
Given that the issue here is poetry, the Wesen in question lies in poetizing, in
how a poem comes to poetize some matter or other. To remark upon the Ort
of a poem is to consider the way in which the poem is “collected” and
“released” into poetizing.
Let us consider the Ort at work. Poems say things in many ways. For ex-
ample, a poem might recount a poet’s aesthetic development, as does Words-
worth’s Prelude, or develop aesthetic commitments, as does Stevens’ Notes
Towards a Supreme Fiction. A poem might also portray an event in the manner of
Tennyson’s The Charge of the Light Brigade, or, yet again, express intense feelings
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of alienation as does Sylvia Plath’s Firesong. If we raise the question of the Ort
in these cases, the issue concerns the gathering of such poems into their 
poetizing, into their disclosure of aesthetic development, a philosophy of art, a
battle, or an author’s sense of the corruption of life. This is not an issue of
poetic content, however, but an issue of a poem’s focus, qua poem, upon 
what it would say. Wordsworth’s Prelude is about aesthetic development, but 
the question of its Ort is concerned with the poem’s ability to articulate aes-
thetic development. Second, this is not an issue of what the poem expresses, 
as if the poem were a mere symptom of some deeper, infrastructural force. 
An Ort can never be expressed by any poem, for a poem must already be 
poetizing in order to express anything. And as the Ort is precisely the site 
of that gathering that allows expression, it must necessarily lie before every 
case of expression.
If an Ort is not expressed by a poem, where does one  nd it? On my read-
ing, Heidegger opts to take the poem at its word, which is to say, he expects
the language of the poem to articulate its own Ort.10 In seeking the Ort of the
poetic, he seeks what we could call an Ur-poem, a poem of poetry that marks
the rim of the Ort in which the language of the poem is gathered. Of course,
Heidegger does not employ the  gure of the Ur-poem, but he does write of 
a Grundstimmung (1934), a dichtende Wort (1942), a Gedichtete (1943), Grundworte
(1946), and a Gedicht (1954), all of which supposedly articulate the essential site
of whatever poetry is in question (respectively, Hölderlin’s Germanien, Andenken,
Der Ister, and the corpuses of Rilke and Trakl). Described generically, the play
of an author’s principal  gures characterizes the being, or rather, the coming
to be of the poem, i.e., its Wesen.11 For example, the interplay of Rilke’s rhetoric
of the heart, the open, nature, angels, lovers, and Orpheus stage the coming to
pass of the being of the poem. Or, to invoke Hölderlin,  gures like the river,
the demigod, nature, divinities, and the  owers of the mouth should be taken,
when read as a constellation, as contributions to a  gurative dance enacting the
being of the poem.12
What does it mean to take the poem at its word, however, particularly since
Heidegger is so fond of claiming that the Ur-poem lies unspoken within an
author’s work?13 According to “Sprache im Gedicht,” one’s reading must involve
an Erläuterung, a “clari cation.” “Because the poet’s singular Ur-poem always
remains within the unspoken, we can situate its site only in trying to point to
it by means of what the individual poems speak. And for that reason each poem
will be in need of clari cation” (UzS, 38). Uncovering an author’s Ur-poem thus
involves a reciprocal strategy wherein one construes an Ur-poem out of select
poems and then returns what has been construed to other poems in order to
test the  delity of one’s “exposition.”14
In his 1943 reading of Hölderlin’s Der Ister, Heidegger terms the stuV of these
construals “annotations,” Anmerkungen. According to Heiddeger, these annota-
tions are markers (Merkmale), signs set along textual paths that direct one
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towards an Ur-poem. Through annotations, Heidegger thus reads until his feel
for an Ur-poem and each particular poem coincides. As he writes in June of
1943:
Was immer auch eine Erläuterung vermag und was sie nicht vermag, von
ihr gilt stets dieses: damit das im Gedicht rein Gedichtes um einiges klarer
dastehe, muß die erläuternde Rede sich und ihr Versuchtes jedesmal zer-
brechen. Um des Gedichteten will muß die Erläuterung des Gedichtes
danach trachten, sich selbst über üssig zu machen. Der letzte, aber auch 
der schwerste Schritt jeder Auslegung besteht darin, mit ihren Erläuterun-
gen vor dem reinen Dastehen des Gedichtes zu verschwinden. . . . [If so]
meinen wir beim wiederholenden Lesen, wir hatten die Gedichte schon 
immer so verstanden.
[Whatever else a clari cation can or cannot do, this always applies: in order
that what is purely poetized [our Ur-poem] may stand within the poem a lit-
tle more clearly, the clarifying speech, at each turn, must break itself and
what it has attempted. For the sake of what is poetized [the Ur-poem] the
clari cation of the poem must proceed in such a way that it makes itself
super uous. The  nal yet most diYcult step of every interpretation consists
in this, to disappear with its clari cations before the pure standing of what
is poetized [the Ur-poem]. . . . [If so] with repeated reading we’ll suppose
that we had always understood the poems in this way.] (EHD, 9)15
The clari cation of the Erläuterung therefore should dissolve into the exposition
of the Erörterung, exposing an Ur-poem which marks and  gures the Ort of poet-
izing itself.
Heidegger’s readings are not intended to revolutionize literary history or crit-
icism, however. Instead, they aim at revolutionizing our dasein. Let us turn,
then, to the question of poetic founding, keeping in view the ground we have
covered, for it will turn out that this Ur-poem holds a measure for those who
have come to the end of metaphysics.
II. An Added Dimension
The poets, so we believe, remind the philosophers, again and
again, of the world’s ba Þ ing presence.
—Charles Simic
The key to poetic measure lies, I believe, in Heidegger’s later discussions of
“dwelling.” In “Bauen, Wohnen, Denken,” Heidegger claims that Wohnen involves
the fundamental character (Grundzug ) of human beings, it is “the way in which
mortals are upon the earth” (VA, 142; BW2, 350). Or: “Dwelling . . . is the fun-
damental relation of being according to which (demgemäß ) mortals are” (VA, 155;
BW2, 362). More speci cally, “dwelling” names the way in which human
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beings undergo relations with themselves, the world, as well as Sein itself. In
short, “dwelling” names our fundamental relation to the horizon of disclosure
wherein beings appear, receive determinations, correspond to or elude deter-
minations, etc. Dwelling is thus a matter of our Wesen, of how we come to be
the beings we are.
What, though, is the relation of “dwelling” to poetry? In “. . . dichterisch woh-
net der Mensch . . .” Heidegger claims: “Poetizing [Dichten] is the originary
allowance-of-dwelling [Wohnenlassen]” (VA, 196; PLT, 227). At the heart of
Wohnen, therefore, Heidegger  nds poetizing. Or, to be more precise, that
which brings us into relation with the horizon of disclosure wherein we dwell
itself occurs or comes to pass as the lassen of a Dichten. Or, in yet other words,
poetizing holds the measure for human dwelling. But what could this mean?
According to Heidegger, dwelling is intimately bound to “building,” Bauen,
and vise versa. Dwelling involves our standing within a horizon of disclosure,
what Heidegger at one point terms the Dimension (VA, 189; PLT, 220). And 
yet, we are able to undergo disclosures if and only if the Dimension has been
“measured” or “surveyed”— vermessen (VA, 189; PLT, 221). In other words, the
Dimension unfolds only in virtue of its being measured; that is, we dwell only in
relation to some measure. But then, there can be no measuring-building un-
less we are already dwelling, unless we are already arising within a horizon of
disclosure. As Heidegger writes in Bauen, Wohnen, Denken: “Only when we are
able to dwell can we build” (VA, 155; BW2, 362). The two are equiprimordial.
Why? Consider the reverse. How could pure Dimension be disclosed? What
would a dwelling-place be without a here or there? Put simply, there is no
Dimension per se, only a given Dimension, one already measured. But then, nei-
ther is there building apart from some Dimension, apart from some horizon—
such a building would have no dimensions.16
This interdependence between building and dwelling is crucial for an under-
standing of poetry’s role in our dwelling, for poetizing is, according to
Heidegger, building par excellence.
Das wohnen aber geschieht nur, wenn das Dichten sich ereignet und west
und zwar in der Weise, deren Wesen wir jetzt ahnen, nämlich als die Maß-
Nahme für alles Messen. Sie ist selber das eigentliche Vermessen, kein bloßes
Abmessen mit fertigen Maßstäben zur Verfertigung von Plänen. Das Dich-
ten ist darum auch kein Bauen im Sinne des Errichtens und Einrichtens 
von Bauten. Aber das Dichten ist das eigentliche Ermessen, der Dimension
des Wohnens das anfängliche Bauen. Das Dichten läßt das Wohnen des
Men-schen allererst in sein Wesen ein. Das Dichten ist das ursprüngliche
Wohnenlassen.
[But dwelling happens only if poetizing takes place and comes to pass (sich
ereignet und west), and indeed in the way of . . . the measure-taking (Maß-Nahme )
for all measuring (messen). This measure-taking is itself the most proper, not
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a bare gauging (Abmessen) with ready-made yardsticks (Maßstäben) for the
preparation of maps. Likewise, poetizing is not building in the sense of rais-
ing and  tting buildings. Rather, poetizing, as the most proper appraisal
(Ermessen) of the dimension of dwelling, is inceptual building. Before anything
else, poetizing admits the dwelling of human beings into its Wesen [the man-
ner of its coming to pass, or its essence]. Poetizing is the originary allowance-
of-dwelling (Wohnenlassen).] (VA, 196)
Poetizing is an arranging of the Dimension at its “inception,” its Anfang, an event
of originary  guration. Dichten is thus originary “measure-taking.” It does not
simply measure a given dimension or area, but poetizes the measure of a hori-
zon of disclosure itself. Now it is through this “most proper appraisal,” this
Ermessen, that poetizing builds a site for human dwelling. In arranging a
Dimension, in providing a Maß, Dichten out ts a dwelling-place, as it were, such
that we might dwell there.
At this point, at least two questions press themselves upon us. First, what is
involved in “appraising” a dimension, or “surveying” it? Second, how does this
activity enable dwelling? Let us begin with the former.
As noted earlier, one cannot apprehend the Dimension as if it were something
present. Appraisal is thus not a rare ed form of poetic intuition. Instead, it must
take place along side building, which in this case involves the production of
poetic determinations. Let us consider an example, but one closer to our own
period than the mytho-poetic musings of Hölderlin. A few years ago, after an
already distinguished career, A. R. Ammons published Garbage, a poem iron-
ically described at its outset as “that great poem the world is waiting for” and
as one of “those celestial guidance systems.”17 The poem, dense and rich
beyond what I shall say, presents us with a  gure, a garbage mound, “which
is about the pre-socratic idea of the / dispositional axis from stone to, wind /
to stone,” which is to say, it is about the generation of form, matter, and sense,
of persons, twigs, and waste, of thumb nails, paper plates, and uranium
deposits; all to say, it is about what is (G, 20). The conceit works by taking the
transmutations that govern the ‘life’ of the mound as the play of a necessity that
moves through and animates all things as “eternity’s glint: it all wraps back
round, / into and out of form, palpable and impalpable” (G, 22). And Ammons
is rigorous in his deployment of this conceit, refusing to reduce it to the ma-
terial or the spiritual, insisting instead that it includes both.18 Moreover, the
work of transmutation along the “dispositional axis” that he terms a “spindle
of energy” never becomes a thing among the things produced. Rather, the
poem announces: “only born die, and if something is / born or new, then that
is not it, that is not / the it: the it is the indiVerence of all the / diVerences, the
nothingness of all the poised / somethings, the  nest issues of energy in which
boulders and dead stars  oat” (G, 27). And  nally, Ammons brilliantly  gures
his conceit by refusing to employ periods, opting instead for the colon (:)—
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a graphic instance of the “dispositional axis,” the hinge upon which the poem’s
own sentences swing, the shoot through which all waste must travel.19
Back to our question as to the nature of poetic appraisal. Using Ammons as
an example, we should begin by claiming that “appraisal,” Ermessen, occurs
within the production of lyrical determinations, taking “lyric” in its most extra-
vagant sense: poetry, neither narratively based nor dramatic in form, which
grapples with concerns and questions considered essential to human exist-
ence.20 And yet, the production of names does not in itself constitute poetic
appraisal. If it did, Dichten would in fact be analogous to the “raising and 
 t-ting of buildings,” something Heidegger denies, claiming instead that 
Ermessen involves anfängliche Bauen, “inceptual building.” But then, what does 
it involve?
Let us consider this appeal to the Anfang. In his reading of Hölderlin’s
Germanien, Heidegger distinguishes between the Beginn and an Anfang, tethering
the latter to the Ursprung, the origin. A Beginn marks the actual onset of some-
thing, for example (and it is Heidegger’s), a change in the weather “begins”
with an event, say a storm. The Anfang, however, lies in the atmospheric
changes that lead to the storm. Thus a “Beginn ist jenes, womit etwas anhebt,
Anfang das, woraus etwas entspringt,” that is, a “Beginn is that with which
something commences, an Anfang that from which something originates, leaps
forth” (GA 39: 3). The Anfang thus marks a gathering of elements that results in
a certain event; it is the Ur-sprung, the source from which some event leaps
forth, “ent-springt.”21 If Dichten is anfängliche Bauen, then it must “appraise” the
Dimension at the scene of its emergence, in its leaping forth. But if the Dimension
only comes to be alongside of a “surveying,” a Vermessen, in order to catch the
Dimension at the scene of its emergence one must catch it as it opens in and
alongside its surveyance. Or to use the language of the Kunstwerkes piece, the
task involves “appraising” the “clearing of openness” (the Lichtung ) within the
“arranging” (the Einrichtung ) of “sites  lled by present beings [einer von
Anwesenedem erfullten Stätte]” (H, 48; BW2, 186). But is not poetry responsible for
the surveyance? Indeed. Thus appraising involves tracking the gathering of the
Dimension within the poem’s own language. In the Ammons poem, this would
involve tracking the gathering of those fundamental, poetic names, names like
“garbage,” “dispositional axis,” “spindle of energy,” etc., which purportedly
“survey” the Dimension of human dwelling.
On the reading being developed here, the claim is that poetic appraisal,
Ermessen, takes place when the names that arrange and establish the Dimension
or an Open-region are tracked with regards to their own emergence. But how
is a poem to do this? Said briskly, by poetizing naming itself, or rather, by poet-
izing poetizing. In the Ammons poem, this occurs when the  gure of the
garbage mound, with its endless transmutations, turns back upon the poem
itself, as in the following passages: “there is a mound, / too, in the poet’s mind
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dead language is hauled / oV to and burned down on, the energy held and /
haped into new turns and clusters, the mind / strengthened by what it strength-
ens” (G, 20). And less directly: “but we are natural: nature, not / we, gave rise
to us: we are not, though, though / natural, divorced from higher,  ner con-
 gurations: / tissues and holograms of energy circulate in / us and seek and  nd
representations of themselves / outside us, so that we can participate in / cele-
brations high and know reaches of feeling / and sight and thought that pene-
trate (really / penetrate) far, far beyond these our wet cells, / right on up past
our stories, the planets, moons / and other bodies . . . oh yes, in the abiding
where / mind but nothing else abides, the eternal, / until it turns into another
pear or sun sh” (G, 21–22). And  nally, as we’ve already noted, this poem too
is garbage, punctuation and all, a Schwingungsraum of cesspool choirs.
But where is the clearing of openness in all this? How does this recoil of the
garbage  gure  nger the rim of an openness whose clearance enables its own
 guration? A diYcult question, for here assertions fail, begging the question,
overlooking their own Anfang, forgetting their own reliance upon names, upon
an open already cleared. The mute limits of assertion recall the fate of the Ur-
poem’s articulation of the Ort of poetizing. In its re exivity, the Ur-poem nei-
ther expresses nor represents, at the level of content, its own gathering, for such
forms presuppose what they would provide. Should one conclude, therefore,
that “appraisal” is not itself a naming? This seems too hasty.22 Does not the
Ammons poem direct us towards its source, and with names: “a spindle of
energy,” a “dispositional axis,” the movement of matter into spirit into mat-
ter, ellipses dotting the dance? And does not it also push past these names to
“eternity’s glint,” even drawing when speaking fails, i.e., “:”? Most certainly,
but we must not be misled, for no one  gure, line, phrase, or name (or sum 
of them all) traces the way in which the open is cleared. Instead, the inter-
section of all these forces directs us towards their scene of emergence, their 
Ort, that is, dances of  gures push past themselves to their horizonal rim, 
where they fall oV, taking us with them: “dance / peopling the centers and dis-
tances, the faraway / galactic slurs even, luminescences, plasmas, / those burns,
the same principle: but here on / those heights, terns and  ies avoid the clos-
est / precincts of the  ame, the terrifying transformations, / the disappear-
ances of anything of interest, / morsel, gobbet, trace of maple syrop, fat worm”
(G, 31).23 To dwell, however, there is no avoiding the “closest precincts of 
the  ame.”
Poetizing, as measure-taking, appraises the Dimension in poetizing its own
emergence by waxing lyrical and reaching past these  ourishes. Articulating the
clearing of the Dimension, poetizing tracks the emergence of its own  guration.
But note: this is precisely what takes place in the Ur-poem—a poetizing of
poetry, a poetizing of the Anfang, of language’s leap into poetry. Can we claim,
therefore, that the poetic “appraisal” of the Dimension takes place in the lan-
guage of the Ur-poem, in that language’s turn towards an appraising  guration
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of its own Ort? But this rings absurd, for it seems to bind humans to the being
of poetry. And yet, Heidegger has claimed that human beings dwell poetically.
Where is the sense in this? I think it hinges on Heidegger’s claim that one can-
not think the Wesen of any being except through a language of Wesen, and thus
necessarily upon some account of the Wesen of language. In “. . . dichterisch
wohnet der Mensch . . .,” he writes:
Woher nimmt der Mensch überhaupt den Anspruch, in das Wesen einer
Sache zu gelangen? Der Mensch kann diesen Anspruch nur dorther nehmen,
von woher er ihn empfängt. Er empfängt ihn aus dem Zuspruch der
Sprache. Freilich nur dann, wenn er und solange er das eigene Wesen der
Sprache schon achtet. . . . Denn eigentlich spricht die Sprache. Der Mensch
spricht erst und nur, insofern er der Sprache entspricht, indem er auf ihren
Zuspruch hört. (VA, 183–84; PLT, 215–16)
[From where do humans, as a whole, make the claim (Anspruch) of having
arrived at the Wesen of something? Humans can make such a claim only from
where they have received it. Humans receive such a claim from the exhor-
tation (Zuspruch ) of language. But of course, only when and so long as they
abide by the most proper Wesen of language. . . . Because, properly speaking,
language speaks. Humans speak  rst and only insofar as they co-respond
(entsprechen) to language, listening to its exhortation.]
Generically, we could say that humans dwell by co-responding to a horizon of
disclosure, by being always already amid disclosure. But our entry into this
“midst” only comes to pass when we co-respond to the “exhortation” of lan-
guage, that is, we come to be among disclosures in a co-responding to the
address of language. And thus it is alongside of a response to the exhortation
of language that we arrive at the Wesen of something, including ourselves.24
Concerning the Ur-poem, then, my claim is that by “appraising” its own emer-
gence into language, the Ur-poem engages and  gures a relation between its
own determinations and their emergence into language that unveils or “sur-
veys” the Wesen of language. In so engaging the Wesen of language, the Ur-
poem thus provides an encounter with language, one through which all
wesentlich inquiries might travel, including the pursuit of the originary scene 
of human dwelling. In other words, the Ur-poem produces an Ursprache, a 
language which “appraises” the Dimension wherein all other disclosures come 
to pass.25 When Heidegger claims, therefore, that the “co-responding through
which humans properly listen to the exhortation of language is that say-
ing that speaks in the element of poetizing,” we can regard poetizing here 
as the doubling turn of a language tracking its own originary emergence. We
might even say that a “proper listening” to the exhortation of language in-
volves a  gurative “appraisal,” and that this is precisely what the poetizing of
the Ur-poem accomplishes.26
It seems that the self- guring play of the Ur-poem might in fact be bound
to the question of human dwelling. And yet, what does Heidegger mean when
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he claims that this form of poetizing “allows” human dwelling, that Ur-poetry
involves a Wohnenlassen? This emphasis on lassen rings in obvious contrast to a
rhetoric of causality. If we are to understand how an Ur-poem allows us to
dwell, we will have to work our way out of some common intuitions concern-
ing the nature of production. One can see why Heidegger would not want to
speak of poetry as the causal force behind human dwelling. Such a notion is
wedded to the notion of eYcient causality, a concept Heidegger considers a
perversion.27 More importantly, eYcient causality involves two present forces
meeting one another, resulting in some eVect. Where in such a schema can one
 nd, however, the subtle play of Lichtung and Einrichtung? For all intents and
purposes, the event wherein the open is cleared, an event assumed in all rela-
tions, causal or otherwise, is overlooked when the rhetoric of eYcient causality
is employed. But revealing the clearing of the open is the key to poetic build-
ing. In fact, the Ur-poem only  nds its way to its own Ort by attending to the
clearing of the open that underwrites its own emergence into language. It seems
clear, then, that poetic building does not cause some Dimension to unfold as
Hume’s billiard balls cause, or seem to cause, one another to bound along the
rails. But how are we to understand this?
Let us work more carefully with “Die Frage nach Der Technik.” After refusing
to consider the concept of the cause within the framework of eYcient cau-
sality, Heidegger writes:
Causa, casus, gehört zum Zeitwort cadere, fallen, und bedeutet dasjenige,
was bewirkt, daß etwas im Erfolg so oder so ausfällt. Die Lehre von den vier
Ursachen geht auf Aristoltes zurück. Im Bereich des griechischen Denkens
und für dieses hat jedoch alles, was die nachkommenden Zeitalter bei den
Griechen unter der Vorstellung und dem Titel “Kausalität” suchen, schlech-
tin nichts mit dem Wirken und Bewirken zu tun. Was wir Ursache, die
Römer causa nennen, heißt bei den Griechen aàton, das, was ein anderes
verschuldet. Die vier Ursachen sind die unter sich zusammengehörigen
Wesien des Verschuldens. (VA, 16; BW2, 314)
[Causa, casus, belongs to the verb cadere, to fall, and means that which eVects
[things] such that, as a result, such and such comes about. The doctrine of
the four causes comes from Aristotle. Within and for the realm of Greek
thought, however, everything for which later ages search among the Greeks
with the conception and term “causality” has simply nothing to do with
working-upon and eVecting. What we name “cause,” what the Romans name
causa, is called by the Greeks aition, that to which something else is indebted.
The four causes, all belonging to one another, are ways of being-responsible-
for-something.]28
First, note that the issue is the Ursache, the  rst thing, the originary matter.
What is at issue then is the origin, the Ursprung. One should expect to confront,
therefore, matters concerning what must have occurred in the  rst place given
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that things are the way they are.29 Second, Heidegger, with characteristic and
exaggerated severity, is attempting to wrest the notion of causality away from
the Latin world in order to give it a Greek spin.30 Third, he translates the
thought of the Ursache within terms of indebtedness, even guilt—Verschulden,
which Lovitt has rendered as “being-responsible-for-something.”31 Now in its
most general sense, Heidegger understands Verschulden to involve “bringing
something to presence.” More precisely, the four ways of being-responsible-for-
something have “den Grundzug dieses Anlassens in die Ankunft,” that is “the funda-
mental characteristic of releasing something into its arrival” (VA, 14; BW2, 316).
Why the emphasis on lassen? As I noted earlier, I think it has to do with Hei-
degger’s attempt to recover a sense of the clearing of openness within the event
of presencing. If we set at the heart of causality this notion of “releasing some-
thing into its arrival,” we engage several questions. First, we render presencing
an event, thus provoking us to seek the origin of what has come to pass.
Second, we are made aware of the temporality of presencing in the fact that
presencing happens. Third, the moment of release adds a dimension to the inter-
action of those forces or beings that in fact emerge into presence. And it is this
added dimension that concerns us here, for it marks both (a) the dimension of
the Ort as a gathering force at work in the language of the poem and (b) the
dimension of the Dimension from which poetic building takes its leave and to
which it returns human dwelling.
We might deepen this discussion by noting that Heidegger eventually claims
that the essence of Kausalität is Veranlassung, meaning “to occasion” but also to
“call forth” (VA, 14; BW2, 316). This means, I take it, that Heidegger would
have us regard the inception or origin of something as a “calling-forth” of
something into its arrival, into presence, an arrival we earlier described in our
discussion of the Anfang as an entspringen, a “leaping-forth.” According to Hei-
degger, then, “to occasion” something is not to produce it ex nihilo, or to run
into it thus redirecting its passage through space, but to gather and start it down
some path, to direct its arrival in a certain way, to call it forth to a certain way
of being.32 Now this should recall our earlier discussion of the Anfang and the
storm. The Anfang is not the Ur-production and ignition of the storm’s form,
matter, and end, but a gathering of those moments, a gathering that allows
them to arrive into presence. Why “allow”? Because the gathering is not itself
a present force among those gathered, but the scene of their convergence, or
even what calls them to convene.33
Perhaps we are in a better position now to make sense of the claim:
“Poetizing is the originary allowance-of-dwelling (Wohnenlassen).” In allowing us
to dwell, poetizing does not simply erect a dwelling, leaving us to worry about
the perspicuity of our view. Instead, it calls us forth to a site wherein we might
dwell. Now recall that dwelling, wohnen, names the way in which humans
undergo relations with things themselves, even the event of presencing itself. As
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Heidegger says, it is our way or manner of being upon the earth. To say then
that poetizing allows us to dwell is to say that poetizing calls us forth into this
way of being upon the earth; that is, it enables us to arrive into presence in a
certain way. More speci cally, it allows us to arrive into presence within the
appraising- guration of the Ur-poem. On the one hand, the Ur-poem arranges
a Dimension through the interplay of its lyrical determinations: river, demi-
god, divinities,  owers (Hölderlin); angel, heart, Orpheus, rose (Rilke); twilight,
silence, madness, wall (Trakl); spindle, colon, trash, and more trash (Ammons).
This is the moment of Einrichtung, of building and arranging across an open
region. On the other hand, the Ur-poem reaches past these determinations to
the point of their and its emergence, to the Ort, the “tip of the spear” around
which “everything runs together.” And in so reaching, it unveils the clearing 
of openness, the Lichtung, which opens the Dimension within which (a) the lan-
guage of the poem unfolds and (b) an open region is arranged. And it is this
exposure of the opening open, through and beyond the Ur-poem’s own lyrical
determinations, which calls us forth to a certain kind of presencing. More
speci cally, the Ur-poem’s exposure of the Lichtung tags us with a language
attuned to the clearing of the open that foregrounds, even underwrites, the very
emergence of things.
An example. In Garbage we hear: “holy, holy, / holy, the driver [of a garbage
truck] cries and  icks his cigarette / in a spiritual swoop that  oats and  oats
before / it touches ground: here, driver knows, / where the consummations
gather, where the disposal /  ows out of form, where the last translations / cast
away their immutable bits and scraps; /  its of steel, shivers of bottle and tum-
bler, / here is the gateway to beginning, here the portal / of renewing change,
the birdshit, even, melding / enrichingly in with debris, a loam for the roots /
of placenta: oh nature, the man on the edge of the cardboard-laced cliVs
exclaims, that there could be a straightaway from the toxic past into / the
fusion-lit reaches of a coming time!” (G, 28–29). It is this “gateway to the begin-
ning,” or rather Ursprung, which concerns us, this “portal.” The Ur-poem calls
us forth into this portal, sets us there—allows us to undergo disclosure under
its canopy. But the issue is not simply the open region of disclosure, as if that
were the scene of human dwelling. As we have noted repeatedly, there is no
such thing—we are never simply there, in the open. The double saying of the
Ur-poem is thus the key, for human dwelling is precisely doubled in this 
way: present, alongside others and things, but also among them, among “this”
and “that,” which is to say, just past them (and ourselves) as well, both “mist”
and “matter.”
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III. Exploring the Open Ranges
The skreak and skritter of evening gone
And grackles gone and sorrows of the sun,
The sorrows of the sun, too gone . . . the moon and moon,
The yellow moon of words about the nightingale
In measureless measures, not a bird for me
But the name of a bird and the name of a nameless air
I have never—shall never hear. And yet beneath
The stillness that comes to me out of this, beneath
The stillness of everything gone, and being still,
Being and sitting still, something resides,
Some skreaking and skittering residuum,
And grates these evasions of the nightingale
Though I have never—shall never hear that bird.
And the stillness is in the key, all of it is,
The stillness is all in the key of that desolate sound.
—Wallace Stevens, “Autumn Refrain”34
If the Ur-poem in fact calls us to a scene of dwelling through its  gurative
appraisals, one must ask: How should this  guration be regarded once it has
been built? What does it mean to dwell through an Ur-poem? What is a Woh-
nung? Or, how does an Ursprache engage and inform a Dimension of disclosure?
Let us begin with some preliminary observations. If our Wohnung is founded
in the language of an Ur-poem, then the  gures of that poetry mark the limits
of the horizon of disclosure even as they gesture past those limits. In this regard,
then, an Ursprache is akin to Kant’s notion in the Critique of Pure Reason of Sinn-
lichkeit, “sensibility,” the a priori arena wherein objects of intuition are given to
us (A19/B33). And yet, the productive and responsive play of the language of
the poem is not the work of a transcendental subject. Instead of delimiting 
the horizon of disclosure within the intuitional folds of space and time, the 
Ur-poem itself  gures the Dimension of human existence. For example, if we 
follow Hölderlin as read by Heidegger in the 1950s, we will  nd ourselves in 
a dwelling built around the play of the Geviert, the fourfold, a constellation 
of earth and sky, divinities and mortals. Or, to invoke Rilke, our Wohnung
might be  gured in the spherical play of erotic life turning into death, turning
into life.
While the analogy with Kant has obvious limits, it does underscore one cen-
tral fact: Ur-poetry does not create a world thing by thing, but determines or
occasions (recalling our discussion of Veranlassung) how a “world worlds,” how
the play of its presences and absences swirl about us. In other words, in allow-
ing us to encounter the Wesen of language at the point of its inception, neither
the Ur-poem nor the poet name discrete things. As Heidegger writes, the fact
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that poetic language  gures our horizons of disclosure “never means that lan-
guage, in any old meaning picked up at will, immediately and de nitively sup-
plies us with the transparent Wesen of the matter like some object ready to be
used” (VA, 184; PLT, 216). Why? As we’ve seen, the poetry unfolding here 
neither expresses nor represents the Ort of its and our gathering. In other 
words, it is nonpropositional; no predicates are ascribed to individuals (e.g., this
rock is garbage) or classes (all / some rocks are garbage). Heidegger is not pro-
posing that poetic names somehow magically summon or control the “essence”
of things. Or to put the emphasis elsewhere, this is not a referential poetry, not
a poetry that aspires to name anything at all, but one that  guratively traces
the rim of its and our being.
But how? How does the language of Ur-poetry stand in relation to the
Dimension of human dwelling? One might think, following Schürmann, who 
also begins with Kantian intuitions about the nature of human dwelling, that
Ur-poetry supplies “inceptual categories of presencing” according to which dis-
closures take place. Schürmann believes that properly understood, the language
of “category” captures the way in which building and dwelling intertwine. He
writes: “If it is understood that the traditional term ‘category’ is here shorn not
only of all ousiological and subjectivist connotations, but also of all references
to phenomenal regions . . . if it is understood, in other words, that categorein, ‘to
accuse,’ no longer means ‘to address oneself to entities as such,’ but to address
presencing and its manifold ways of diVering from the economies of presence,
then nothing prohibits rehabilitating this venerable word.”35 While there is 
a certain attractiveness to Schürmann’s tack, its emphasis on the structural is
troubling, for it leaves the event of  guration no longer poetic. In a way,
Heidegger anticipates this trouble when he claims in the Beiträge that the lan-
guage of categories remains inextricably tied to the language of Urteil, judg-
ment (GA 65: 135–36). This marks a problem because within what claims 
to be originary, it re-inscribes a more original governing agency. In terms 
of the language of the Ur-poem, this would mean that poetic building is ac-
tually the product of a deeper, extra-poetic agency, and Heidegger is quite clear
that with regards to the language of the poem, the origin lies within poetic 
language itself.
On  rst glance, Schürmann seems to elude our worry, for his central claim
is that the rx® of these categories is in fact an-archic. But does not categorical
language re-inscribe a judging agent into presencing? In a fascinating way, this
re-inscription occurs in Schürmann’s own discussion. In elaborating his anar-
chic categories of presencing, Schürmann is compelled to chastise Heidegger
for what he terms a “category mistake” (HBA, 176–77). On the one hand,
Schürmann claims, Heidegger rightly treats lñgow as a structural antecedent to
the event of presencing. On the other hand, however, Heidegger also proceeds
as if lñgow marked an actual, historical antecedent to the event of presencing.
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And this, Schürmann continues, confuses a category with its application. And
yet, how could such be avoided when the issue is presencing? If categories are
to  gure disclosure, one cannot keep them “categorically” distinct from what
they  gure, for otherwise one will to have appeal to a dhmiourgñw who brings
together the categories with the stuV to be fashioned according to their lights.
And this is precisely, I take it, the heart of Heidegger’s worry in the Beiträge—
categories remain parasitic upon some agent who applies them. We need to
reach past a rhetoric of categorein, therefore, in order fathom the work of Ur-
poetic  gurations.
I am inclined to  nd in Schürmann the limits of our Kantian intuitions
regarding the way in which Ur-poetry comes to arrange an open Dimension of
disclosure. Perhaps we might draw a more productive lead from a source less
ensnared in the traditions of German Idealism. In order to de-subjectivize and
de-transcendentalize poetic building altogether, Andrzej Warminski has sug-
gested that we understand the  gurative power of the poetic word in terms of
catachresis, that is, in terms of a certain class of names that are thoroughly
metaphorical, e.g., mountain face. He opts for this term because “it is the  g-
ure of all  guration; but in being such, it is a monstrous  gure in so far as it
un-says its referential pretensions, that is, undoes them.”36 Monstrosity arises
because within the very idea of catachresis a naming lurks that occurs in defer-
ral; that is, built into the name “mountain face” is the thought that this part of
the mountain bears its name only through the intercession of a third, and this
third defers inquiry into the origin of poetic building; i.e., such inquiry only
encounters a clearing of the openness that enables, but is not present in, the
language of the poem, except perhaps as a “stillness keyed in a desolate sound,”
to recall Stevens’ “Autumn Refrain.” Following Warminski, therefore, we could
regard poetic building as the work of catachresis, the presentation of in nitely
deferring metaphors.
Warminski’s tack troubles me, however, for it draws the language of Wesen
outside of the work of poetizing and into the history of poetics. Moreover, it
leaves us asking about the Wesen of this term “catachresis” that proposes to
name the  guring work of language. Now Warminski is shrewd enough to
anticipate this concern, and thus refuses to regard catachresis as a name at all.
Instead, it eludes the realm of semantics as a “syntactical marker,” a “syntacti-
cal plug,” a site in “language’s material conditions of possibility” (RII, xxx-
xxxiii, liii, 70). This position is untenable, however, for two reasons. First, the
very distinction between syntax and semantics is a semantic one, and thus the
logic of Warminski’s claim fails from the outset to escape the binds of seman-
tics, even though he insists that this sense of “syntax” is a nondialectical other
to semantics. Second, Warminski oddly refuses to interrogate the Wesen of his
own language of “syntax” and “language’s material conditions of possibility.”
Instead, he proceeds as if these were not names themselves. I think his attempt
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to account for the work of poetic  guration ultimately fails to engage the prob-
lem, therefore, or rather, it fails to accept that poetic names, semantically
charged, are the only originary signs we have.
While Warminski’s turn to the rhetoric of poetics does not, I believe, allow
us to come to terms with the nature of poetic dwelling, his emphasis upon the
“monstrosity” of poetic  guration merits our attention, for it captures a key ele-
ment in the drama of poetic building and dwelling. In the Kunstwerkes piece,
Heidegger writes:
Je einsamer das Werk, festgestellt in die Gestalt, in sich steht, je reiner es alle
Bezüge zu den Menschen zu lösen scheint, um so einfacher tritt der Stoß,
das solches Werk ist, ins OVene, um so wesentlicher ist das Ungeheure
aufgestoßen und das bislang geheure Scheinende umgestoßen. Aber dieses
vielfältige Stoßen hat nichts Gewaltsames; denn je reiner das Werk selbst 
in die durch es selbst eröVnete OVenheit des Seienden entrückt ist, um 
so einfacher rückt es uns in diese OVenheit ein und so zugleich aus dem
Gewöhnlichen heraus. Dieser Verrückung folgen, heißt: die gewohnten
Bezüge zur Welt und zur Erde verwandeln und fortan mit allem geläu gen
Tun und Schätzen, Kennen und Blicken ansichhalten, um in der im Werk
geschehenden Wahrheit zu verweilen. (H, 52–53; BW2, 191)
[The more solitarily the work stands on its own, established in a form, seem-
ing to let go, cleanly, all ties to human being, the more simply does it strike
into the open that such a work is, the more essentially is the monstrous
thrown open and what was long-familiar over thrown. But this manifold
striking and throwing is nothing violent; for the more purely the work itself
is carried oV into the openness of beings, what it itself has opened, the more
easily does it throw us into this openness and, simultaneously, out of the 
commonplace. To submit to this displacement, that means: to transform
accustomed ties to world and earth and, henceforth, to keep oneself from all
well-known ways of acting and assessing, knowing and viewing, in order to
tarry with the truth occurring in the work.]37
This is a remarkably rich passage. Let me note several things. First, if we accept
that “truth” here refers to what is disclosed by the work, what comes to uncon-
cealment in the work, then it would seem that the truth with which we are to
tarry is that which the work reveals as “monstrous,” the Ungeheure. But what is
monstrous here? Truth, that is, unconcealment itself. Heidegger writes: “Die
OVenheit dieses OVenen, d.h. die Wahrheit, kann nur sein, was sie ist, näm-
lich diese OVenheit, wenn sie sich und solange sie sich selbst in ihr OVenes 
einrichtet. Darum muß in diesem OVenen je ein Seiendes sein, worin die
OVenheit ihren Stand und ihre Ständigkeit nimmt [The openness of this open
region, that is, truth, only can be what it is, namely, this openness, if and so
long as it arranges itself within its open region. In this open region there must
be, therefore, a being in which openness takes its stand and attains constancy]”
(H, 47; BW2, 186).38 As I see it, the point is that the originary or inceptual site
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of disclosure, what we have regarded as an Ort of poetic  guration and the open
dimensions of human dwelling, comes to presence in a being, in the presenc-
ing of a being. (In our context, this being would be a poetic determination.)
And yet, this dependency on a presencing being (or a word) conceals the
moment of Lichtung, of clearing; that is, a being or poetic determination cannot
re-present the clearing of that openness that enables it. Thus: “Die Wahrheit
west als solche im Gegeneinander von Lichtung und zweifacher Verbergung
[Truth, as such, essentially comes to pass in the opposition of clearing and dou-
ble concealing]” (H, 47; BW2, 185).39 But what is monstrous in this? Let us con-
sider three things.40
First, a vast power is at play in the work of art insofar as it brings about
unconcealment, truth, in an originary fashion. We are discussing here the gath-
ering of a horizon of disclosure, a calling-forth of something to its essence, a
gathering from the “extremes” to recall our earlier discussion of the Ort (UzS,
38; OWL, 159–60). At work in the work of art, therefore, in the Ur-poem, is a
monstrous power of sorts, and Heidegger’s appeal to the “monstrous” conveys
this.41 Second, the sheer un-representability of the clearing of openness is tinged
with the monstrous, but in the sense of the extraordinary. Concerning Höl-
derlin’s use of “Ungeheure,” Heidegger writes of the Außergewöhnliche, that which
is not simply nonordinary, but ungraspable within the realm of the ordinary
(GA 53: 77–78; DI, 63–64). In other words, the event of unconcealment cannot
be accounted for as something either zuhanden, ready-to-hand, or vorhanden, pre-
sent-at-hand. In fact, the event of unconcealment is never “at hand” at all, and
thus not a matter for re-presentation. With regard to truth as l®yeia, John
Sallis has written of a “divergence from nature in nature,” of a force at work
in nature that is not present in nature.42 In this context, I think we could speak
of “a divergence from the ordinary within the ordinary,” and stress the within,
for as we have noted, “in the open region there must be a being in which open-
ness takes its stand and attains constancy.”
A third moment concerns the most obvious sense of the monstrous: the
frightful. Heidegger himself notes that the emergence of the monstrous subjects
us to displacement. Note the strength in the word Verrückung: displace, shift, dis-
arrange. And then, to be verrückt is to be mad, crazy, insane, cracked. As the
monstrous is thrown open, we are jolted out of ourselves. More speci cally, we
are thrown out of accustomed ways of “acting and assessing, knowing and view-
ing.” In other words, the emergence of the monstrous brings with it a kind of
exile, a banishment from what, until then, had carried us along. And yet,
Heidegger downplays this aspect of the monstrous, claiming that it is “nothing
violent.” On the one hand, I can appreciate his resistance. If the work of art
were viewed as violent, if its transformative power were regarded as a cause,
then we again would lose the moment of the clearing in the arrangement of an
open region of disclosure. Also, I think Heidegger is at pains to free the power
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of the work of art (and unconcealment itself ) from human subjectivity. As he
notes, a work of art draws us towards truth the more cleanly it cuts “all ties to
human being.” But if we stress the violent nature of the work’s impact, we draw
the work back into a relation with us and run the risk of reducing its power to
reader response, thus losing the originary altogether.43 And yet, one cannot
deny the transformative power of exile. Why, even as it opens the openness of
beings, the work itself is “carried oV ” into that openness, that is, it is entrückt.
As with Verrückung, this is a powerful word. Not only does it suggest being 
carried oV, but it also connotes ecstasy and rapture. It is as if the work, in 
being drawn towards its own Ort, drew us as well, called to us, thus carrying
us oV in the wake of a move towards its source. And from the perspective 
of the everyday, of accustomed, habitual comfort, this can be a moment of 
violence, of uprooting, Heidegger’s disclaimer notwithstanding.
This language of the monstrous highlights, I think, an integral moment in
poetic founding. Recall that the Ur-poem enables us to dwell because, in expos-
ing its own Ort, it calls us to the originary site of disclosure by allowing us to
attend to the essence of language. And in doing so, it provides an Ursprache that
 gures that site, that is, which brings or gathers all determinations to the scene
of their emergence. Now, as we have just seen, something monstrous is at work,
and both within the call to the originary site, and the site itself, for therein lurks:
(1) a double-concealment amidst a powerful unconcealment, (2) an event not
translatable into rhetorics of presence, re-presentation, or expression, (3) a
moment of ecstatic exile from what had been ordinary, and (4) a no doubt
frightful encounter with the uncanniness of disclosure per se. On the one hand,
then, the Ur-poem calls us forth to a site of dwelling, allowing us to tarry there
(verweilen). On the other hand, it also jolts us, yanks us away from the custom-
ary. Alongside poetic founding, we should expect, therefore, to encounter exile,
and perhaps a certain kind of madness.
Given this emphasis upon monstrous excesses in the open region to which
the Ur-poem calls us, one cannot help but wonder about the importance of any
given determination in the work of poetic founding. After all, if the point is just
to announce the abysmal grounding of beings, it is not clear that any founding
poem need have more than one monstrous  gure. This is a reasonable ques-
tion, but it conceals an important misunderstanding as well as a profound limit
to the language we have employed thus far. We tend to speak and write as if
the open region of beings, the horizon of disclosure, were a place through
which all beings traveled. If this were the case, then we could rest with a few
names that locate it, point it out, if only under erasure. But such a picture is
misleading, for the open region of beings is less a place than an event of clear-
ing that accompanies all presencing. The clearing of openness is not some par-
ticular thing in need of a clever name, but an event that accompanies and
haunts all names, all  gures. An Ursprache is thus not a collection of names 
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for some monstrous element of the world, but a play of  gures that unveils 
the world in its monstrous worlding. Or, in less dramatic form, the Ur-poem
provides us with a set of  gures whose interaction and play enable us to en-
gage beings in the event of their presencing and not just as present beings. 
The  gures of the Ur-poem thus accompany particular disclosures like 
shrouds, drawing them back towards the originary site of disclosure. And this
is the point—not simply to point out the diVerential nature of disclosure, but
to provide a language that can bring an entire range of disclosures back into
the folds of this diVerential site.
This section’s initial question is still with us, however. How should we regard
the  gures that make up an Ursprache once they are set into a form and be-
gin to gather disclosures within their monstrous reach? In other words, what
does it mean to speak, or to speak within, such a language? Having rejected
the paths oVered by Schürmann and Warminski, what are we to say about 
Ur-poetry?
I think we might take our leave from a determination invoked in Heideg-
ger’s 1942 course on Hölderlin’s Andenken. In that course, Heidegger regards
what is poetized, the Gedichtete (our Ur-poem) as the product of a dichtende 
Wort, a “poetic word” that überdichtet, “over-poetizes” (as one might overrun) the
language of the poem. More speci cally, it “öVnet und verschließt einen
Reichtum, der unerschöp ich ist, weil er der Art des Anfänglichen und d.h. des
Einfachen hat [opens and secures an abundance that is inexhaustible because
it has an inceptual, and that means simple, character]” (GA 52: 13). The dich-
tende Wort calls the language of the poem to an abundance, but in the sense of
a “wealth of opportunity.” And it is this wealth of opportunity that concerns
us. If you recall, the site of human dwelling involves the ways in which human
beings undergo disclosure, that is, it involves our relations or ties to the earth
and world, our “ways of acting and assessing, knowing and viewing” (H, 53;
BW2, 191).44 The site of human dwelling is thus a site of opportunity, of pos-
sible ways of engaging beings as they come to presence, e.g., faces, stones,
rivers, trash bins, dingoes, cottage cheese, even poems. Given this, I think the
key to understanding the existential force of Ur-poetry lies in this abundance.
In explicating the nature of poetic abundance, Heidegger writes of
Schwingungsräume, what I earlier translated as “ranges of vibration.”45 What is
striking about this term is its musical connotations—chords and strings vibrat-
ing, producing ranges of sound. And these connotations are not limited to this
word. Across Heidegger’s texts, one  nds musical  gures. In Der Satz vom Grund,
he refers to the Tonart, the “tonality” of the principle of suYcient reason, and
views his accentuation of moments therein, e.g., the copula, as Betonungen, 
“intonations” (SVG, 91–92 and 86; PR, 50 and 46).46 Likewise, in a late read-
ing of Hölderlin, he focuses upon the Grundton of a verse, though one can  nd
this language as well in “Sprache im Gedicht” and “Der Satz der Identität” (VA, 185;
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UzS, 78; ID, 12–13). And then, the notion of a Grundstimmung is rife with musi-
cal senses given the verb stimmen can mean “to tune an instrument.” Finally,
Heidegger regards the  gure of the art work, within which truth comes to pass,
as a kind of fugue. Of a work’s Gestalt, he writes: “Sie ist das Gefüge, als welche
der Riß sich fügt. Der gefügte Riß is die Fuge des Scheinens der Wahrheit
[Figure is the fugal structure in which the rift composes itself. This composed
rift is the fugue of truth’s shining]” (H, 50; BW2, 189).47 Where is all of this
heading? I want to claim that the Ur-poem animates human dwelling like a
tonal scale animates a work written within its con nes. In other words, the Ur-
poem institutes “ranges of vibration” that eVectively tune disclosures such that
they and we are brought back to the site of our mutual emergence as we leap
or sound forth.
Consider the matter this way. A given poetic  gure marks a Grundton, a “fun-
damental tone”: for example, Rilke’s “angel,” Hölderlin’s “river,” Trakl’s “lep-
rosy.” Now within a given corpus, several  gures come together to produce a
tonality, a tonal range, what I take to a Schwingungsraum . For example, we could
speak of the tonality of Ammons’s poem in terms of matter, spirit, the disposi-
tional axis, garbage, “:,” energy, etc. When we do, it is crucial to prioritize the
interplay of the whole rather than assemble the  gures in a cumulative fashion.
In other words, no one word speaks on its own.48 With this play of  gures in
tow, I think we can understand the Ur-poem’s monstrous force within human
dwelling as we do the force of a tonal scale within a given piece of music. Just
as every piece and every note within those pieces sounds out within a tonal
scale, so each disclosure enters the scene of human dwelling having taken its
leave from the tonal backdrop of an Ur-music.49 Thus every particular, say, my
hand, or my toes moving in my shoes, or the view from my window, some
voices down the hall, or the milk souring in my refrigerator while my nieces
dance and sing in Indiana—each would have a place within the range of vibra-
tion that  ows from a  gurative tonality.
If we follow the view being sketched here, and regard poetic founding as the
institution of  gurative tonalities within the scene of human dwelling, we will
have to regard these tonalities as nonreferential. That is, the Ur-music of the
Ur-poem must be a matter of absolute music. The term “absolute music” has
an interesting and rich history, one tied to a legitimation crisis concerning
purely instrumental music.50 Most generally, the term re ects a commitment on
the part of theorists like Eduard Hanslick to liberate instrumental music from
the derivative status it held well into the eighteenth century. That such a liber-
ation would be necessary may strike twentieth century listeners as strange, but
even in the nineteenth century, people like Wagner argued that instrumental
music remained incomplete without the presence of word-driven texts. At the
heart of this notion of absolute music there lurks, therefore, the idea that instru-
mental music should not be subordinated to other modes of artistic production,
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e.g., the plays of the human voice, the lyrics of a song, or to dance or drama
(as in ballet and opera). And in a more complicated way, the drive towards
absolute music envisions a music uninterested in musically enacting narratives
(as Richard Strauss does in his Death and Transguration) or representing extra-
musical contents (as Vivaldi’s Four Seasons purports to do). In shedding these lat-
ter binds, “absolute music” functions as a contrast term to “program music,”
music that develops a subject matter (e.g., the story of Don Juan) within its own,
musical language (e.g., a symphonic poem). In other words, in trying to distin-
guish itself from program music, absolute music draws itself outside of the
bounds of external reference.
It is as an absolute music, radically liberated from programmatic concerns,
that I want to regard the Ur-poem and the dwelling it builds for human beings.
Why? Because the “range of vibration” instituted by the Ur-poem neither
expresses nor re-presents anything. In fact, we cannot even regard the Ur-poem
as a matter of some “content” at play in the language of the poem, for then
that language would be articulating what  rst enables its articulation. In other
words, the Ursprache provided by the Ur-poem marks the rim of our being, and
is thus part and parcel of the condition of the possibility of reference, not itself
referential except in a self- gurative fashion. And it is in these terms that
absolute music has been thematized. As Hanslick writes:
Music consists of tonal sequences, tonal forms; these have no other content
than themselves. They remind us once again of architecture and dancing,
which likewise bring us beautiful relationships without content. However
each person may evaluate and name the eVect of a piece of music . . . its con-
tent is nothing but the audible tonal forms; since music speaks not merely by
means of tones, it speaks only tones.51
And so is the case, I take it, with the Ur-poem and the “range of vibrations”
that it “arranges” or einrichtet. About nothing beyond its own coming to be, it
does not speak by means of poetic  gures, but speaks only poetic  gures. As
Heidegger writes in the lecture on Andenken: “Die wesentliche Dichtung bezeugt sich
zuerst darin, daß ihr Gedichtetes nur im Bereich dieser sich überschwingungden Räume sich
hält and aus ihnen spricht,” that is: Essential poetry above all bears witness to itself
in that what it poetizes only abides and speaks out of the region of those super-
resonating ranges [which it itself has poetized] (GA 52: 15).
I am trying to develop an analogy between nonreferential tonal ranges 
and the Ur-poems that key, according to Heidegger, human dwelling. I am
doing so given the failure of explanations drawn from Kantian intuitions
(Schürmann) and the history of poetics (Warminski). But it is only an analogy.
In the end, the language of the poem will have to prove primary, for otherwise
this analogy will usurp the originary place of the Ur-poem. Still, I  nd it a help-
ful analogy for at least two reasons beyond those already given. First, in any
piece, the tonal scale is not somehow determining the piece from a mysterious
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beyond. Instead, it suVuses it. Or we might say that the piece belongs to a tonal
abundance such that, at the moment of performance, the piece stands beyond
yet remains bound to the scale. This captures, I think, the play of an Ur-poem
in human dwelling. It plays over us just as the dichtende Wort over-poetizes the
language of the poem. And while we can speak of an Ur-poem as something
in itself, a collection of  gures, just as we can demarcate tonal scales (e.g., 
8-tone and 12-tone scales), at the level of dwelling, the “range of vibration”
suVuses our way within the world and upon the earth. A second strength to the
analogy is bound to the integral role that silence plays in the deployment of
tonal scales. Pieces of music can draw sustenance from the abundance of a
tonal scale if and only if they are marked by silence, for tones can resound
alongside of one another only when some distance separates their vibrations,
only when their vibrations take place in silent spaces. This is crucial, for the
Ur-music of the Ur-poem is far from seamless. As we have seen, its ability to
call human dwelling to an originary site is predicated upon its ability to ex-
pose the silence left in the wake of that monstrous clearing of openness that
gathers human beings and Ur-poems alike into the open region of beings. In
over-poetizing us as well as the language of the poem, the Ur-poem calls us to
the monstrous traces that outline the rim of our being. In other words, poetic
dwelling comes into its own in response to an Ur-poem whose absolute music
calls us into tonal ranges punctuated by silence.
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NOTES
1. Dean Young. Strike Anywhere. (Denver: University Press of Colorado. 1995), 16–17.
2. William James. Pragmatism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 95.
3. Rorty’s sense of this banality is at play throughout the second volume of his Philosophical Papers,
particularly in “Habermas and Lyotard on postmodernity,” “Is Derrida a transcendental
philosopher?,” and “Heidegger, contingency, and pragmatism.” See Richard Rorty. Essays on
Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers Volume 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),
164–176, 119–128, and 27–49.
4. Respectively, see: SZ, 226; BT, 269, and W, 193; BW2, 132. A word about the translations.
Unless noted, all translations are my own. If the passage exceeds a sentence or two, the
German will be provided. Also, key German terms will be noted parenthetically if the passage
is given in English alone. Finally, all citations from Heidegger’s texts will be provided within
the text and abbreviations employed.  A key for the abbreviations lies at the end of this paper.
5. Philip Levine. What Work Is (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 38.
6. See similar remarks in “Wozu Dichter?” and “Das Wesen der Sprache” (H, 269; PLT, 95 and UzS,
165–66; OWL, 63).
7. Given economic demands, we cannot consider for whom these poets supposedly write. Such a
discussion is an important one and would lead us to interrogate Heidegger’s appeal to the Volk
when, in the 1930’s, he imagined the form a poetically grounded human dwelling would
assume. And it would lead us to ask why, in the 1950s, the  gure of the Volk replaced the
 gure of die Sterblichen, “the mortals”? And to what eVect, if in fact we are able to ask that 
question? Another issue we unfortunately will not address concerns whether the measures in
question must be provided by poesy in distinction to other literary and nonliterary forms of
 guration. This too is an interesting question, but I will have to address it elsewhere.
8. A notable exception to this is Arthur Grugan’s “Heidegger: Preparing to Read Hölderlin’s
Germanien,” a study that has proven helpful to me in the course of my research. (See Arthur 
A. Grugan, “Heidegger Preparing to Read Hölderlin’s Germanien,” Research in Phenomenology 19
(1989): 139–167.) Also, Fóti, in her reading of the Der Ister course, quite helpfully explores
Heidegger’s annotative strategy. (See Véronique Fóti. Heidegger and the Poets [Atlantic Highlands,
NJ: Humanities Press International Inc., 1992], 44–59), hereafter cited as HAP.
9. One could (and should) pursue this model through all of Heidegger’s readings. One would  nd
remarkable similarities from 1934 onwards. Such an account would consume this paper, how-
ever, and thus I will draw a few connections in footnotes.
10. As we shall see, this approach to the language of the poem is not unrelated to the belief that
poets can provide human existence with a measure. In fact, prior to reading Rilke, Heidegger
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states that “poets in a time of need must poetize, above all, the essence of poetry” (H, 268;
PLT, 94).
11. When reading Germanien in 1934, Heidegger terms the Grundstimmung the “Machtbereich der
Dichtung,” the “power-region of the [Hölderlin’s] poetry” (GA 39: 139). And when reading Der
Rhein, he states that “we seek the inner-core of the poetry, the Grundstimmuing,” adding later
that “[d]ie entrückende-einrückende und eröVende-überantwortende Grundstimmung stimmt den sagenden
Entwurf des Dichters [the enrapturing—engaging and inaugurating—surrendering Grundstim-mung
tunes the saying-projection of the poet]” (GA 39: 163 and 223).
12. In the 1942 lecture course on Hölderlin’s Andenken, Heidegger writes of Schwingungsräume,
“ranges of vibration” that are opened in the play of a poem’s own dichtende Wort. Now these
ranges, which the dichtende Wort arranges, demarcate the Ort of the poem’s saying. “Die
wesentliche Dichtung bezeugt sich zuerst darin, daß ihr Gedichtetes nur im Bereich dieser sich überschwingun-
den Räume sich hält and aus ihnen spricht [Essential poetry above all bears witness to itself in 
that what it poetizes only abides and speaks out of the region of those super-resonating
ranges]” (GA 52: 15). In other words, essential poetry speaks within ranges of its own making,
ranges arranged by an Ur-poem. One  nds a similar thought in the reading of Germanien and
Der Rhein. There Heidegger writes of a Schwingungsgefüge, a “resonant fugue” that secures,
through the Grundstimmung, the sense of a poem all the way down to its word order. Heidegger
writes: “Das Schwingungsgefüge des Sagens ist . . . bestimmt durch die Grundstimmung der Dichtung, die sich
im inneren Aufriß des ganzen ihre Gestalt verschaVt [The resonant fugue of the saying is . . . deter-
mined through the Grundstimmung of the poetry, which raises itself within the inner outline of
the whole of its form]” (GA 39: 15). Later, we will return to these musical overtures in an eVort
to come to terms with the results of poetic building.
13. As he writes when reading Trakl: “The Ur-poem [Gedicht] of a poet remains unspoken. Neither
the individual poems nor the whole says everything. Nevertheless, every poem speaks out of
the whole of this Ur-poem, and says the Ur-poem every time. From the site of the Ur-poem
rises the wave which, unfailingly, moves the saying as something poetic” (UzS, 38; OWL, 160).
14. This is undoubtedly a complex process unto itself, and one would do well to trace it 
through Heidegger’s readings. One would  nd, I think, a remarkable consistency. For exam-
ple, when lecturing on Hölderlin’s Andenken in 1942, Heidegger writes of a Horchen before 
Hören that directs a reading through a “venture,” a Wagen, which is accompanied by a wait-
ing for the fruits of that venture to arrive (GA 52: 13–14). We haven’t time to pursue this 
further, however.
15. Because my emphasis is upon poetic building, I must leave to the side several issues of inter-
pretation, most notably those raised by Véronique Fóti in her Heidegger and the Poets. There she
accuses Heidegger of several interpretive blunders, e.g., “privileging . . . diachronicity over syn-
chronicity,” a shortcoming that issues in a “certain disregard for lexis in favor of the event-like
singularity and the etymological historicality of the singularized word” (HAP, 36). Also, she
objects to what she regards as a totalizing and violent projection of the history of being upon
texts that resist the closure such a vision entails (HAP, 111). As I have argued in a review of
her study, I  nd her reading ungenerous to a fault and insuYciently re exive about her own
interpretive commitments, particularly concerning Rilke’s work. Nevertheless, she raises im-
portant questions to which I cannot do justice here. For the review, see John T. Lysaker,
“Heidegger After the Fall,” Research in Phenomenology 23 (1993): 201–11.
16. This interplay recalls the interplay between Lichtung and Einrichtung in the Kunstwerkes piece. 
In discussing how truth comes to pass in the work of art, Heidegger insists that disclosure of
beings occurs only within the double event (which shares a single essence) of a Lichtung der
OVenheit and an Einrichtung in das OVene, a “clearing of openness” and an “arranging across the
open” (H, 48; BW2, 186).
17. A. R. Ammons. Garbage (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1993), 13 and 15. Hereafter,
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all cites to the poem will be given in the text using the abbreviation G.
18. Rather than tell us that the spindle of energy animating the mound (and all things) is both
material and spiritual, Ammons simply invokes both terms, playing them oV one another with-
out resolution, leaving us to ask: “but what about the spirit, does it die / in an instant, being
nothing in an instant out of / matter, or does it hold on to some measure of / time, not just
the eternity in which it is not, / but does death go one being death for a billion / years: this
one fact put down is put down / forever, is it, or for forever, forever to be a / part of the
changes about it, switches in the / earth’s magnetic  eld, asteroid collisions, / tectonic under-
plays, to be molten and then not / molten, again and again: when does a fact end” (G, 37–38).
This is a remarkable passage, particularly when read alongside Celan’s Engführung, for there
Celan recoils in horror from a purely vegetative world which addresses us, dead and living,
with “a / green / silence, a sepal, an / idea of vegetation attached to it—/ green yes, /
attached, yes, / under a sneering / sky. / Of, yes, / vegetation” (Paul Celan, Gesammelte Werke,
vol. 1 [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. 1983], 200–201). I have modi ed Michael
Hamburger’s translation from Poems of Paul Celan (New York: Persea Books, 1988), 143.
19. When the poem asks: “is a poem about garbage garbage / or will this abstract, hollow junk
seem beautiful / and necessary as just another oVering to the / high assimilations,” one must
answer yes to both sides of the disjunction (G, 30).
20. The actual history of the “lyric” is vast, long, and riddled with vagueness and ambiguity. I have
adopted a de nition that captures those pretensions in scope and form that have caught the
attention of critics as diverse as de Man and Adorno, while paying heed to the common
assumption that lyric poetry concerns the deepest of problems. As Charles Simic writes:
“Lyricism, in its truest sense, is the awe before the untranslatable. Like childhood, it is a lan-
guage that cannot be replaced by any other language. A great lyric poem must approach
untranslatability” (Charles Simic. The Unemployed Fortune Teller [Ann Arbor: The University of
Michigan Press. 1994], 112). And, in a line that brings the goal of this essay to light: “Both
poetry and philosophy, for instance, are concerned with Being. What is a lyric poem, one
might say, but the recreation of the experience of Being. In both cases, that need to get down
to essentials, to say the unsayable and let the truth of Being shine through” (Charles Simic,
Wonderful Words, Silent Truths [Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press. 1990], 60).
21. Heidegger oVers the same distinction almost twenty years later in the 1951–52 course pub-
lished as Was Heisst Denken? (WHD, 98; WCT, 152).
22. In the least, even the failure of naming needs to be regarded as a form of naming under era-
sure, as John Sallis has shown in his “Poetics” ( John Sallis, Echoes: After Heidegger Bloomington:
Indiana University Press. 1990], 168–189).
23. As I noted earlier, this  gural play is what Heidegger tracks when he reads Hölderlin, Rilke,
and Trakl: the intersection of their central  gures. As Fóti has noted, he tends to overlook the
contribution of non-thematic elements to this process, but I think she is wrong to say that he
is deaf to auto guration in the language of the poem (HAP, 36–37). This is, I take it, his pri-
mary concern.
24. This echoes an argument from “Das Wesen der Sprache” where Heidegger insists that a lan-
guage of essence must proceed along and atop the lines of the essence of language (UzS, 180–
81; OWL, 94–6).
25. While my interpretation no doubt pushes Heidegger’s texts to certain lengths, exploiting cer-
tain tendencies at the expense of others, I think my reading carries forward insights at the heart
of Heidegger’s encounter with poetry, a heart forcefully apparent in “Hölderlin und das Wesen der
Dichtung”: “Dichtung ist das stiftende Nennen des Seins und des Wesens aller Dinge—kein
beliebiges Sagen, sondern jenes, wodurch erst all das ins OVene tritt, was wir dann in der
Alltagssprache bereden und verhandeln. Daher nimmt die Dichtung niemals der Sprache 
als einen vorhandenen WerkstoV auf, sondern die Dichtung selbst ermöglicht erst die Spra-
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che. Dichtung ist die Ursprache eines geschichtlichen Volkes. Also muß . . . das Wesen der
Sprache aus dem Wesen der Dichtung verstanden werden.” My translation reads: “Poetry 
is the founding naming of being and the essence of all things—not any old saying, but that
through which everything, what we discuss and debate in common language,  rst steps into
the open. Therefore poetry never takes up language as some raw material ready at hand, but
rather, poetry itself  rst enables language. Poetry is the originary language [Ursprache] of a his-
torical Volk. Thus . . . the essence of language must be understood through the essence of
poetry” (EHD, 43). But why a Volk? Must human being’s dwell in the form of a Volk?
26. The introduction of a response into the work of appraisal recalls the Derrida-Dastur
“exchange” in footnote 5 of Of Spirit. There, Derrida re ects upon the ways in which Heideg-
ger’s thought might be said to move beyond the privilege of the question ( Jacques Derrida, Of
Spirit: Heidegger and the Question [Chicago: University of Chicago, 1989], 129–136). Interestingly,
Heidegger’s readings often  nd a response to an address at the inception of poetic saying. 
In the early Hölderlin readings, the coming of the poem is tied to the strike of the divine for
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the Wesensherkunft, the “essential descent” of the site of human dwelling through the work of
Dichten, poetizing.
30. I have often wondered whether Heidegger’s conceptual genealogies, in praising Greece and
excoriating Rome, do not reintroduce a notion of eYcient causality into the history of lan-
guage? How is it that Roman translations led us so far astray? How can changes in usage
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31. Heidegger is careful to deny the term’s moralistic overtones, and with good reason given our
liberal tendency to  nd in responsibility an agent taking care of those events that s/he has
brought about (VA, 14; BW2, 316).
32. This issue is obscured in Hofstadter’s translation of “Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes.” At least twice
he translates lassen as cause (H, 31–32; BW2, 171–172). He does so even though Heidegger
explicitly asserts that “the work in no way in uences [entwirkt] hitherto existing beings through
causal connections [kausale Wirkungszussamhänge]” (H, 58; BW2, 197).
33. It would be interesting to play this thought into Kant’s discussion of the  rst antinomy. One
might imagine Heidegger arguing that if reason comes to this antinomy and nds it irrecon-
cilable, this is because it (a) limits causality to eYcient causality, and (b) understands the prin-
ciple of suYcient reason in a way that forgets that reason also needs to be gathered in order
to determine the scope of its own suYciency, and thus it cannot be bounded by the logic of
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11–13 (GA 53, 69–91; DI, 55–74). There, he works with the Ungeheure because Hölderlin uses
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43. In reading Der Ister, Heidegger brings these several senses of Ungeheure into the term
“Unheimlich,” the “uncanny,” retaining, for the most part, the issues discussed above. And he
is careful to stress that the “uncanniness” of all presencing “entsteht nicht erst zufolge des
Menschentums, sondern dieses kommt aus der Unheimlichkeit und bleibt in ihr [does not  rst arise as a
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Moreover, he adds a few lines later: “Noch sind wir gewohnt, das Unheimliche mehr im Sinne eines
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